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OWNERSHIP CONTROL OVER
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS TEAMS'
PAYROLLS: COULD ANYONE HAVE
STOPPED TOM WERNER FROM
DISMANTLING THE SAN DIEGO
PADRES?
L. PATRICK AULD*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Note examines the rights and responsibilities of major
league sports franchise ownership groups, focusing specifically
upon events during recent years involving the San Diego Padres
major league baseball club. In addition, it compares and contrasts
these events to other professional sports contexts. The Note con-
centrates on player personnel and payroll, the major issues of the
controversy in San Diego, while offering parallels to ownership
control over other matters in the world of sports. The Note is or-
ganized in the following fashion: first, a brief description of the
perceived problems posed by absolute ownership autonomy; sec-
ond, a discussion of the arguments depicting the perceived prob-
lem as unmanageable or non-existent; and third, analyses of the
various options available to those parties aggrieved by certain own-
ership decisions.
II. THE PERCEIVED PROBLEM
Most observers would concede that an owner of a major league
sports team should have a great deal of autonomy to determine
how the business of the franchise ought to be conducted.1 How-
ever, certain forms of ownership action draw intense negative pub-
lic reaction. This phenomena is perhaps most pronounced when
* Law Clerk, Honorable N. Carlton Tilley, Jr. J.D. 1995, Yale Law School; B.A. 1992,
Wake Forest University. The author wishes to thank Professor Stanton Wheeler for his cri-
tique of an earlier draft of this Note.
1. See, e.g. John Harris, Fiduciary Duties of Professional Team Sports Franchise
Owners, 2 S'roN HALL J. SPORT L. 255, 266 (1991). Even Harris, who is intensly critical of
unchecked ownership autonomy, acknowledges that "[a]ll professional sports teams are bus-
iness enterprises. Ownership's retention of profits from operations of teams is the main ob-
jective of the business side of professional sports." Id.
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the owner's actions appear directed toward improving the owner's
financial "bottom line" at the fans' expense.2 The exercise of own-
ership prerogatives in pursuit of increased profits has perhaps been
most carefully considered in the context of franchise relocations.3
However, allegations of ownership "profiteering" arise in other sit-
uations as well.
During the 1992 season, the ownership group of the San Diego
Padres, led by Tom Werner,4 determined that it should engage in
cost-cutting measures. The absence of a full public disclosure of
the team's budget figures and accounting practices makes it un-
clear whether the team was losing money, whether it was projected
to lose money or whether the team was simply not as profitable as
the owners desired.5 Determining a team's financial health is fur-
ther complicated, since year-to-year profitability, as illustrated by
balance sheets and year-end reports, may not accurately reflect the
owners' return on their investment. The Werner Group purchased
the Padres from Joan Kroc in 1990 for $75 million.'Recent studies
of major professional sports franchises valued the Padres franchise
between $85 and $100 million.7 Ultimately, the Werner Group sold
80 percent of the team to John Moores for $80 million. Thus, in
2. See, e.g., id. at 266 ("retention of what the public sees as 'too much' of the profits
and not enough reinvestment back into the team is often seen by the public as disloyal.");
Mortimer Zuckerman, It's Only a Game - Or Was, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Aug. 23,
1993, at 68 (discussing impact of perceived ownership greed on professional sports).
3. See, e.g., Kenneth Shropshire, Opportunistic Sports Franchise Relocations: Can
Punitive Damages in Actions Based Upon Contract Strike a Balance?, 22 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
569 (1989).
4. Werner, a television executive who made millions producing The Cosby Show and
Roseanne, owned a controlling 40% block of the Padres. See John Steinbreder, The Owners,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 13, 1993, at 64.
5. The discussion which follows provides some insights into the Padres' financial situa-
tion; however, for the purposes of this Note, evaluating the club's actual financial condition,
while perhaps informative and interesting, is not critical. Ultimately, this Note is not
designed to determine definitively if the Werner Group acted in "bad faith," but rather to
evaluate how those parties aggrieved by a professional sports franchise owner's decisions
might take recourse. The Padres scenario is simply employed as a plausible factual back-
ground to enrich the analysis. Today, the Montreal Expos situation could just as easily be
substituted. See, e.g., Gordon Edes, Rich Get Richer, Poor Get Poorer, and Baseball Suf-
fers, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, April 9, 1995 at 9C (analogizing Expos recent person-
nel moves to 1993-1994 Padres situation).
6. Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust and the Single Entity
Theory, 67 IND. L.J. 25 (1991).
7. See Michael Ozanian, et. al., The $11 Billion Pastime, FINANCIAL WORLD, May 10,
1994 at 52; Steinbreder, supra note 4. But see Steve Halvonik, Pirates Slip to Last in Base-
ball Franchise Value, PITTSBURGH POsT-GAzETTE, April 19, 1995, at C7 (noting that
FINACIAL WORLD lowered estimated values for most baseball franchises, including the Padres
in 1995, in large part due to the strike).
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four years, the Werner Group earned five million dollars on its in-
vestment, while still retaining a sizeable minority interest 8
In order to achieve the desired savings, the club's front office
engineered a massive payroll cut. By mid-summer 1993, the Padres
had eliminated $25-30 million in salaries from their annual
budget.9 In the process, the Padres either traded or released at
least six starting position players and four top pitchers. At times,
the Padres' revamped starting lineup featured nine players with
less than five years combined major league experience and a com-
bined salary less than the single lowest paid player on the field for
the opposing team.'0 As a result of the moves, the team went from
contending for the National League's West Division crown in 1992
to losing over one hundred games in 1993.11
The apparent dismantling of the team angered many of the
Padres' season ticketholders, fans, and players. Additionally, dam-
age to the game's competitive balance disturbed others, including
major league players' union officials and fans at large. The follow-
ing section examines whether the various interested parties have
legitimate reasons for feeling aggrieved by such drastic unilateral
ownership action. The final section considers the types of recourse
available to critics of ownership action.
III. Is THE PERCEIVED PROBLEM REALLY A PROBLEM AT ALL?
Many observers do not perceive the Werner Groups' player
personnel moves as a problem at all. Some turnover among players
is standard in "rebuilding processes" or "youth movements."1 " Ar-
guably, the emergence of talented, new players on the 1993 club is
evidence that the owners did not gut the franchise, but rather that
the front office made shrewd deals.' s
Such claims are questionable, particularly because the Padres
moved not only older players, but also young superstars, like Gary
Sheffield. As one sportswriter noted, "[i]t's hard to support an ar-
8. See Houston's Moores Purchases 80 Percent of San Diego Padres, HOUSTON
CHRON., Dec. 22, 1994, at 4.
9. Dave Sheinin, Fire Sale in San Diego Leaves Players, Fans Steaming, WASHING-
TON POST, July 5, 1993, at Cl.
10. Id.
11. When the 1994 season was interrupted by the player's strike, the Padres held the
worst record in the National League and were on a pace to lose close to 100 games again.
12. Indeed, the Padres' front office at times denied that the personnel moves were
primarily motivated by budgetary concerns. These claims have been, at best, skeptically
received. See, e.g., Sheinen, supra note 9.
13. Ricky Guitierez, Derek Bell, and Phil Plantier, all acquisitions from this period,
performed well for the Padres during the 1993 season. See id.
1995]
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gument for rebuilding by dealing away a 24-year-old third base-
man who narrowly missed the Triple Crown last season."1 ' In addi-
tion, the Padres spent the 1993-94 offseason shopping some of
their young players, such as Derek Bell, who arrived as unproven
talent, but later emerged as budding stars in 1993.11 Finally,
throughout the period, the Padres reportedly solicited offers for
the team's remaining young star pitcher, Andy Benes, whom the
front office previously described as "untouchable."' 6 These factors
suggest that under Werner, the Padres were fielding teams com-
posed of considerably less talented players in order to achieve
lower payroll costs and higher ownership profits.
Other observers contend that the Padres endured criticism
simply because they were ahead of a wave of much-needed cost-
cutting in the major leagues. These defenders of the Werner Group
point to the lower expected network television revenues and
mounting complaints of financial difficulties in so-called "small
market" cities.17 Only time will allow for a satisfactory evaluation
of these claims. For the purposes of this Note, these claims are
significant in that they illustrate two key problems with policing
ownership actions in the personnel and payroll area: it is difficult
to determine when and by whom an owner should be second-
guessed. Given that an owner and his or her front office would
likely have the best information about how to structure the team,
many observers feel that an owner's decisions should be challenged
only in the court of public opinion, and not in a court of law.",
The argument that regulation of ownership action is too diffi-
cult is only one justification for a laissez-faire approach in this
area. Another similar, but conceptually distinct, argument might
14. Id. In order to win the "Triple Crown" a player must lead his respective league in
batting average, home runs, and "runs batted in" (RBIs).
15. Peter Pascarelli, Baseball Report, THE SPORTING NEWS, November 1, 1993, at 19.
16. Id. Benes was ultimately traded.
17. See Edes, supra note 5; Mark Maske, Six Division Plan for Baseball Passes,
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 10, 1993, at C1 (discussing the financial future of major league
baseball). Whether San Diego, one of the nation's largest cities, is truly a "small market" is
a separate question beyond the scope of this Note. See generally Kevin E. Martens, Fair or
Foul? The Survival of Small Market Teams in Major League Baseball, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.
J. 323 n. 17 (1994) (defining San Diego as a large market).
18. See generally Stephen Ross, Monopoly Sports League, 73 MINN. L. REv. 643, 702-
03, 714 (1989) (attacking judicial regulation of professional sports teams as ineffective and
onerous). See also Robert Baade and Carolyn Tuttle, Owner Collusion or Sound Fiscal
Management: An Analysis of Recent Events in Baseball's Labor Market, 1 SETON HALL J.
SPORT L. 41 (1991). The rationale behind this position can be understood as theoretically
similar to the rationale for the business judgment rule in the general corporate context. See
Robert Clark, CORPORATE LAW (1986) at 123-40.
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be that sports franchise owners have the right to do whatever they
wish as a function of their property right in their team.19 Under
this rationale, Werner would be privileged to field a losing team in
the interest of making money, if he so desired. However, this argu-
ment fails to recognize the monopolistic characteristics of major
league sport organization and the distinctive connection fans have
to sports teams. Both of these factors should arguably temper an
owner's autonomy. In addition, owners have enmeshed themselves
in a complex web of contractual relationships involving players,
municipalities, other owners, and even fans. These entanglements
limit the owner's right to act unilaterally in many contexts and
could even compromise an owner's right to exclusive oversight of
personnel and payroll. The section which follows catalogs the spe-
cific legal challenges owners might face given the cartel-like organi-
zation of their business, the unique relationship between fans and
sports, and existing contractual arrangements.
IV. POTENTIAL RESPONSES OF PARTIES AGGRIEVED BY OWNERSHIP
ACTION
The exercise of decision-making authority by an individual
owner affects a wide range of parties, including players, fans, and
other owners. Not surprisingly, conflict has often arisen between
these various parties. Historically, each of the different constituen-
cies has sought to vindicate its claims in different ways. The sub-
sections which follow discuss the various responses available to the
different parties affected by an owner's management of payroll and
personnel.
A. Fan Boycotts and Direct Pressure: The Market Solution
Market discipline is perhaps the most basic constraint upon
ownership action. Under the market rationale, those persons who
do not approve of ownership action can "vote with their feet" by
not attending games or more likely in today's world, vote with
their remote controls by not watching games. The free market the-
ory posits that lower fan attendance and viewership will lead to
lower revenues for the owner. Ultimately, this trend would force
ownership to change its approach to structuring the club. From
this perspective, fans could indirectly regulate the amount of
19. This position is seldom explicitly articulated, but it has historically informed base-
ball owners' responses to challenges to their autonomy. See generally MARVIN MILLER, A
WHOLE DIFFERENT BALL GAME: THE SPORT AND BUSINESS OF BASEBALL (1991).
1995]
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money an owner would invest in the club's payroll.
In order to effectuate the market sanction more rapidly, fans
must organize. The financial pressure must be complemented by
protests, media campaigns and other forms of direct pressure. In
San Diego, such efforts included a letter-writing campaign to the
San Diego Union-Tribune, calls to local radio talk shows, and pro-
tests both inside and outside of the Padres' stadium.20 Protesters
displaying banners, such as "TRADE WERNER" and "BLUE
LIGHT SPECIAL! 75% OFF!," were ejected from the stadium.2 1
These actions drew protests from the American Civil Liberties
Union. Faced with the threat of a First Amendment lawsuit, the
Padres agreed not to remove banners criticizing the team.2 2 Similar
threats had produced mixed results in previous conflicts. 23 The ef-
fectiveness of such suits will generally turn upon whether the sta-
dium is controlled at least in part by a governmental or quasi-gov-
ernmental body.2
Because the market sanctions, even when supplemented by di-
rect pressure, seem insufficient to constrain ownership action, in-
terest in other forms of action remains. Indeed, in San Diego, de-
spite the organized efforts cited above and the concurrent
precipitous drop in attendance to a league-low 20,000 per game,25
the Werner payroll reductions continued. The chief problem with
applying the market rationale to major league baseball is that the
presupposed elements of the free market are simply not present.
Because of the major league sports owner's guarantee of revenue
through the existing systems of league-wide revenue sharing and
his insulation from competition through the cartel arrangement,
the fans' ability to create financial pressure is severely curtailed.
Contrary to the market hypothesis, the Padres do not earn
revenue in direct proportion to the number of fans who come to
watch the Padres or who choose to watch the Padres on local tele-
vision. Because certain revenues, such as network television con-
20. See Sheinin, supra note 9.
21. Id.
22. ACLU and Padres Reach Agreement Over Sign Confiscation, October 27, 1993,
available on LEXIS, Nexis UPI Library, UPI file.
23. See Lawrence Israeloff, The Sports Fan v. The Sports Team Owner: Does a
Franchise's Prohibition of Spectators' Banners Violate the First Amendment, 24 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 419, 420-23 (1991) (discussing the complaints raised by the ACLU during
a similar conflict involving George Steinbrenner and the New York Yankees).
24. Id. at 423-28.
25. See Sheinin, supra note 9. The Padres finished last in attendance in the National
League in the strike-shortened 1994 season. See Tom Friend, No Need to Show Pity for the
Padres, N.Y. Tis, Apr. 11, 1995, at B14.
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tracts, expansion fees and product licensing revenue are shared in
some league-wide fashion, 6 the Werner Group can take home a
large block of revenue, and perhaps, more importantly, enjoy rising
franchise value 2 7 without substantial support in San Diego.2 8 Wer-
ner thus becomes a classic free rider. He contributes little to the
value of the team or the league as a whole, but he profits from the
investments and efforts of others. This free rider problem could, in
fact, serve as the basis for fiduciary duty actions.29
Finally, the Padres virtually guaranteed position as the only
major league baseball team in San Diego also undermines the ef-
fectiveness of the market solution. 0 Since there are no close sub-
stitutes for major league baseball, fans in San Diego must pay a
severe price for boycotting the team. This problem is magnified by
the unique connection between fans and their local sports teams:
If you reside in or near a city with a professional sports
franchise, it is likely that you are one of the faithful who follow
your team, swell with pride when they win the big game, or take
it a little personally when they lose. Your team is the "home"
team. . .. When standings are published in your newspaper's
sports section, teams are not listed as "Eagles," "Redskins,"
"Cardinals," etc., but rather "Philadelphia," "Washington,"
"Phoenix," etc. It is your city's integrity at stake every time
your team takes the field. This is the way it has been since an-
cient Greek cities vied for Olympic championships."
The Werner Group can never mismanage the Padres out of the
majors (and thus lose its share of league-wide revenues), nor can
another club enter the league to compete against Werner in San
Diego. As a result, the Padres are quite literally the only game in
town when it comes to major league baseball and thus, the existing
market may not afford fans a legitimate mechanism for responding
to ownership actions.
26. See generally PAUL WEILER & GARY ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 414-41 (1993).
27. See discussion supra notes 5-9 and related text.
28. In fact, according to one recent study the Padres had Major League Baseball's
lowest total gate receipts during the 1993 season ($14.1 mil.), and yet were the fourth most
profitable team. Ozanian, supra note 7.
29. See subsection IV.-F. below.
30. Only New York, Los Angeles and Chicago have multiple major league baseball
franchises. Hypothetically, another team could be placed or move to San Diego, but such a
development is extremely unlikely. Expansion and relocation are limited by the owners and
the appearance of financial difficulty in San Diego with one team effectively eliminates any
possibility for the emergence of a competing franchise in the city.
31. Harris, supra note 1 at 255.
19951
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B. The Commissioner's Office: Internal Regulation
The commissioner's office has traditionally served as the key
complement to the market check on ownership action. The posi-
tion of commissioner emerged in major league baseball following
the alleged World Series fix of 1919. 82 The major league owners
agreed that they needed a strong system of internal regulation
headed by a respected leader to restore and to preserve the integ-
rity of the sport." The notion of the noble commissioner empow-
ered to protect the "best interests of the game '3 4 arose out of this
controversy. Because of the commissioner's broad mandate, it is
not surprising that many parties seeking to restrain individual
owners appealed to the office.
The confrontation between Bowie Kuhn and Charlie Finley
highlighted the role of the commissioner in policing the very type
of controversy which now exists in San Diego. Faced with the pros-
pect of losing his many star players as free agency emerged in ma-
jor league baseball, Finley, the colorful owner of the World Cham-
pion Oakland Athletics sold the rights to several of Oakland's
superstars to other clubs for cash.35 Finley claimed that his actions
were in the long-term best interests of the club and that the cash
he received would allow him to build a team in the future."' Com-
missioner Kuhn blocked the sales pursuant to his authority to act
in the "best interests" of the game.37 A federal court affirmed
Kuhn's authority to police Finley's deals."
Today the commissioner's office no longer offers an avenue for
fans or others concerned about major league baseball's competitive
balance to contest ownership action. The baseball commissioner's
office experienced a continual ebbing of authority throughout the
last decade. The last person to hold the position, Fay Vincent, was
driven from office by disgruntled owners in 1992. Vincent, and the
office itself, collapsed under the weight of the central paradox em-
bedded in the system of internal regulation: what happens when
the commissioner's duty to regulate the sport conflicts with his or
her responsibility to serve the owners? Even prior to Vincent's
ouster, observers questioned whether a commissioner could ever
32. See, e.g., Ron Fimrite, His Own Biggest Fan, Sports Illustrated, July 19, 1993, at
76.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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adequately protect interested third parties because of the office's
ties to ownership:
Accordingly, even though commissioners are intended to be
the guardians of their sports and often do have very broad powers
to act (and often do act) 'in the best interests' of those sports, it
can be argued that the public's interests are really secondary to
those of ownership in the appointment and regulation of commis-
sioners.2 The recent developments in major league baseball appear
to confirm these concerns.
Bud Selig, owner of the Milwaukee Brewers, has assumed the
administrative duties of the commissioner's office and the owners
have pushed him to remain in the post." Not surprisingly, Selig
has refused to intervene in any manner in San Diego.41 The hands-
off approach to the controversy in San Diego will likely continue if
and when a new commissioner is selected. The owners appear com-
mitted to formally limiting the office's powers.4a As a result, the
commissioner will have very little leverage to constrain ownership
excesses; indeed, that is the very point of the changes.
Despite its current demise in baseball and its inherent owner-
ship-bent, the commissioner's office may ultimately return as one
of the key mechanisms for policing the actions of individual own-
ers. The commissioner can take informal action, negotiate settle-
ments and mediate disputes. These approaches allow more refined
responses to conflicts arising among owners and between owners
and third parties than do the blunt instruments of litigation or leg-
islation. The owners would clearly prefer self-regulation to ad hoc
supervision by courts or legislatures. If faced with a credible threat
from one of the sources discussed below, the owners might opt to
re-invigorate the commissioner's office in the hopes of diffusing the
movement for external regulation.
C. Antitrust Suits: Leveling the Playing Field Between
Owners and Fans
If fans cannot securely protect their interests through the cur-
rent market for major league baseball or through existing forms of
internal regulation, such as the commissioner's office, what alterna-
tives might be available? This subsection and the next consider
how fans might challenge owners through the legal system, as other
39. Harris, supra note 1, at 260.
40. See Pascarelli, supra note 15.
41. See Sheinin, supra note 9.
42. See Verducci, Have You Seen This Man?, Sports Illustrated, July 5, 1993, at 38.
19951
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interested parties, such as players, have in other contexts. Given
the cartel-like characteristics of major league baseball organization,
an antitrust action represents perhaps the most obvious resolution
for fans aggrieved by the actions of the Werner Group. Such a suit
would likely involve a challenge to the league's restrictions on mar-
ket entry and forms of revenue sharing. As previously noted 8 ,
these horizontal restraints limit the San Diego fans' ability to se-
cure their preferences in the market. Fans could seek to employ
the antitrust laws to create a marketplace in which fans' voices
could be heard.
The first difficulty fans would face in litigating an antitrust
claim against the Padres and the major leagues is, of course, base-
ball's so-called antitrust exemption. The exemption emerged in
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Profes-
sional Baseball Clubs, Inc.," and was based on the Supreme
Court's narrow view of interstate commerce. The Court refused to
extend this immunity to other professional sports." However, the
Court has declined to withdraw baseball's protection from anti-
trust scrutiny. The exemption was most recently reaffirmed in an
opinion by Justice Blackmun in the case of Flood v. Kuhn.4
The case law, from Federal Baseball through Flood, may not
present an absolute bar to an antitrust suit in the Padres scenario.
Flood and many of the previous antitrust challenges against base-
ball (and other professional team sports for that matter) involved a
challenge to the reserve system which indefinitely bound players to
one team.47 A federal judge recently ruled, in Piazza v. Major
League Baseball that the Federal Baseball exemption may only
apply to issues involving the reserve system." In Piazza, members
of the Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg investment group, which sought
to purchase the San Fransisco Giants in 1992, had alleged that Ma-
43. See subsection IV.-A, above
44. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
45. See, e.g., United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955);
Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Haywood v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
46. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
47. See id.
48. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, No. 92-7173 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 1993). The judge's
ruling came in response to a motion for dismissal at the pleading stage. The judge tempered
the ruling by positing alternative grounds for denying Major League Baseball, Inc.'s motion
and by acknowledging the conflicting authority over the breadth of the exemption. Despite
the precedential conflict, the judge refused the defendant's request to certify an interlocu-
tory appeal to the Third Circuit on the issue. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, No. 92-7173
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 1993).
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jor League Baseball, Inc.'s monopolization of the market for major
league professional baseball teams and its restraints upon the
transfer and movement of franchises violated antitrust laws. 9
Piazza may represent the first sign of a new judicial attitude
toward baseball's antitrust status. This development results from a
lack of satisfaction with the Flood rationale and a recognition that
baseball's organization has flaws in need of regulation. This poten-
tially new judicial attitude toward antitrust claims over major
league baseball should also be viewed against a backdrop of
threatened congressional revocation of the Federal Baseball ex-
emption. 50 Grumbling in Congress over baseball's specialized pro-
tection from antitrust liability may well signal the federal courts to
rein in the owners' autonomy. Thus, even without the passage of
new legislation, antitrust challenges to major league baseball's
structure, such as those that might arise from the conflict in San
Diego, might be viable.51
Padres' fans would likely face other difficulties should they
pursue an antitrust suit. First, Congress specifically waived anti-
trust liability in connection with professional sports league's nego-
tiation of league-wide television contracts.2 This exemption may
undermine any claims based upon the sharing of revenue from net-
work contracts. 3 Second, fans would likely face a challenge to their
standing to sue. It may be difficult for Padres' fans to demonstrate,
in tangible terms, how the horizontal restrictions damage them.
One possibility is to bring the suit through a prospective alterna-
tive ownership group who could claim that the league's cartel ar-
rangement unjustly excluded it. Finally, parties challenging the or-
ganization of professional sports leagues face difficult issues of
49. Id.
50. In March of 1993, Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio), chair of the Senate
Judiciary Committee's Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights Subcommittee, intro-
duced The Professional Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1993. S. 500, 103d Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1993). A similar measure was introduced in the House. 1993 U.S. House Bill 108. The
Senate Bill has attracted significant support, but action has been deferred pending further
study at the subcommittee level. See Senate Committee Defers Action on Baseball Bill, 65
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. 442 (September 30, 1993).
51. Of course, fans of teams in other professional sports need not concern themselves
with this preliminary hurdle.
52. See Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1291-95. Some of the bills introduced
into Congress would also eliminate this exemption. See, e.g., 1993 U.S. House Bill 1549.
53. In addition, in professional sports leagues, such as the National Basketball Associ-
ation, which have revenue sharing arrangements between owners and players, certain of the
horizontal restraints may be immune from antitrust liability because they are part of collec-
tive bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Wood v. National Basketball Association, 809 F.2d 954
(2nd Cir. 1987) (discussing the conflict between antitrust and labor law).
1995]
11
Auld: Ownership Control Over Professional Sports Teams' Payrolls: Could
Published by Institutional Repository, 1995
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
proof, particularly given the courts' typical application of rule of
reason, rather than per se analysis, in such cases.' Despite its limi-
tations, an antitrust suit by fans in San Diego would likely spark a
more careful examination of the situation by the league.
D. Suits by Fans and Season Ticketholders: Private En-
forcement of Public Trust Fiduciary Duties and Money Damage
Actions
Antitrust represents only one avenue through which aggrieved
fans in San Diego might attack the actions of the Werner Group.
One author, John Harris, has suggested that professional sports
franchises should be conceived of as public trusts, where fans are
beneficiaries and owners are trustees.5 5 Harris derives this relation-
ship from two sources: fans' perceptions of ownership56 and public
investment in franchises.5 7 Harris argues that this relationship im-
poses responsibilities analogous to trustee-beneficiary fiduciary du-
ties upon franchise owners.58 These duties include the duty to rein-
vest in the team, the duty to furnish information to the public and
the duty to manage the team's resources carefully.59 Harris per-
ceived that these duties would be implicated in a scenario such as
the one which has developed in San Diego. In Harris' view "[i]t
might be a violation of a trust, if, for example, team ownership,
following a title-winning season, traded its valuable players only to
reduce salaries in order to make more profit for management."60
Harris fails to outline how these duties might be enforced in
practice. One possibility is that any fan who could demonstrate the
requisite attachment to the team could claim standing to sue based
on Harris' concept of beneficial ownership. Such a scheme of pri-
vate enforcement raises a host of questions about potential over-
burdening of the court system. Such concerns could be mitigated
54. This discussion offers only a cursory survey of the issues involved in an antitrust
suit of this sort. Outlining the exact contours of the suit is beyond the scope of this note.
See generally Myron Dale and John Hunt, Antitrust Law and Baseball Franchises: Leaving
Your Heart (and the Giants) in San Francisco, 20 N. Ky. L. Rev. 337 (1993).
55. Harris, supra note 1.
56. "Fans' feelings of 'ownership' of their home teams are deeply rooted in the phe-
nomenon of pride in one's hometown. The rights of ownership are not actual; there is no
document or deed transferring title from owner to public. Rather, the feelings are more of a
'beneficial' ownership, where the owner of record acts for the ultimate benefit of the benefi-
ciaries-much like in a trust." Id. at 255.
57. Id. at 256-58.
58. Id. at 256.
59. Id. at 264-75.
60. Id. at 272.
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by restricting enforcement actions to public representatives, such
as governmental bodies. Even under this system, questions could
properly be raised about the capability of courts to evaluate strate-
gic sports personnel decisions.
Harris' scheme also requires significant modifications and/or
expansions of traditional trust doctrines. The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of the Law of Trusts imposes upon trustees a duty "to admin-
ister the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary."61 Arguably,
any owner who earns a profit, either through the operation of the
team or through resale, breaches this duty. The returns earned by
the owner/trustee's management of the franchise should either be
reinvested in the team or disbursed to fans in forms such as lower
ticket prices. Courts deciding a fiduciary duty suit against a profes-
sional sport franchise owner would be hard-pressed to invalidate
some, but not all, forms of profit-taking by owners without muti-
lating existing trust doctrine.
Further, in order for a public trust to arise, the holder of the
property must make a "manifestation of an intention to create the
[public trust]."" A court could conceivably create an implied or
constructive trust, but such action would require some finding of
fraud or an inequitable result.6 3 At an analytical level, the theory
behind the judicial creation of a constructive public trust intersects
with the argument for an eminent domain action by a municipal-
ity."4 Given the doctrinal inconsistencies likely to arise through the
modification and expansion of trust law into the sports franchise
context, eminent domain actions may represent a preferable
course. Indeed, such actions appear more likely to vindicate the
public investment interest Harris' discussed in drawing the trust
analogy.65
Even if the public trust theory proves unworkable, individual
fans should not be left without legal recourse. Season ticketholders
should be able to protect their personal financial investment in the
team (as distinguished from public investment in the team through
stadium deals) by maintaining money damage actions based on
modified theories of misrepresentation (false advertising) or breach
of warranty, if an owner makes drastic changes to the franchise. In
61. Restatement (Second) of the Law of Trusts §170(1) (1959).
62. Restatement (Second) of the Law of Trusts §348 (1959).
63. See Price v. State, 79 Ill. App. 3d 143, 398 N.E. 2d 365 (1979).
64. See subsection IV.-G. below.
65. See supra note 57 and related text. See also subsection IV.-F. for a discussion
suggesting that some forms of public investment may create a joint venture arrangement
between municipalities and professional sports franchise owners and trigger fiduciary duties.
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essence fans were promised a certain product (in the Padres' case-
"major league" baseball) and attracted by promises of perform-
ances by Fred McGriff, Gary Sheffield and Benito Santiago. In-
stead, they received an arguably inadequate substitute.
The Werner Group responded to the threat of such suits by
offering season ticketholders a sell-back option during the 1993
season. The management acknowledged that its offseason promo-
tional material which promised that the "nucleus of the club"
would remain in San Diego may have misled fans. Hundreds of
fans accepted the refund offer within the first few weeks after the
club made it.66 With the rise of more complex ticket arrangements,
such as the lifetime seat licensing agreements used by the National
Football League's expansion Carolina Panthers, 67 the grounds for
these suits should be even further strengthened. The economic im-
pact of such suits upon the team's management would also rise
significantly.
E. Labor Negotiation: Bargaining for Minimum Team
Payrolls
Fans are not the only parties who feel aggrieved by the devel-
opments in San Diego. Players also have raised complaints of
harm, ranging from the psychological damage associated with play-
ing on a poor team and losing long-time teammates, to more subtle
forms of financial damage. Tony Gwynn and Andy Benes, the Pa-
dres' only remaining superstars, have both voiced their anger over
the Werner Group's payroll cuts.68 Players who have been dealt
away or who simply play in the league might also have a grievance
with the Padres. By effectively withdrawing from the market for
high-caliber (or arguably, even moderately talented) players, the
Padres have cut the overall demand for such players by 3-4%."9
This constriction of demand for playing talent will likely have a
negative overall effect on players' salaries. The recent comments of
Major League Baseball Players' Union representative, Don Fehr,
suggest that this development has not gone unnoticed.7 0
Previously, players who were disgruntled about management's
66. Sheinin, supra note 9.
67. See Larry Weisman, Starting from Scratch Taxes Both Groups, USA Today, June
24, 1994 at 10C.
68. Id.
69. As one of 28 major league teams, the Padres are responsible for approximately 1/
28th (or 3-4%) of the demand for major league baseball playing talent.
70. Fehr cited the rise of owners who are "not interested in fielding competitive
teams" as one of the union's top concerns. Maske, supra note 17.
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decisions had only one option: to stage an individual holdout. Now,
with the emergence of collective bargaining, new avenues of action
are available. Gone are the days of ownership domination over
players. The cost of strikes and the owners' desire to secure anti-
trust exemption through the collective bargaining agreement (for
sports other than major league baseball),7 1 have combined to level
the playing field between owners and players.
In major league baseball, players concerned about develop-
ments in San Diego can make the creation of floors on team ex-
penditures part of the collective bargaining agreement.7 Fehr's
comments, noted above, and the union's growing interest in a
broad range of issues beyond the staple concerns of free agency
and pension protection,73 suggest that the player's union may be
prepared to make these types of demands. Not only might these
demands be made, but also, they might succeed as part of a larger
player-owner revenue sharing/salary cap arrangement.7, The own-
ers' chief negotiator, Richard Ravitch, has expressed an interest in
combatting the perceived "small-market" team problem and in-
creasing revenue sharing between the owners.7 5 In addition, a floor
on team's player payrolls would protect the owners from the free-
riding owner problem.7 6 Players have successfully bargained to
limit ownership autonomy in many areas, there is little reason to
believe that they would be less able to secure protection from own-
ers seeking to profit by fielding underfinanced teams.
71. See supra note 53.
72. The players' union has essentially bargained for a floor on team salaries by de-
manding minimum individual salaries. The union would now have to bargain for team
spending floors above the aggregate of the individual minimums.
73. See Mark Maske, Notebook, Washington Post, August 8, 1993, at D10 (discussing
the union's decision to make expansion an issue for the next collective bargaining
agreement).
74. Currently the owners and players remain deadlocked over whether the league
should adopt any form of salary cap. Until the parties negotiate this impasse, the arguments
for a team-wide salary floor are unlikely to receive serious attention. See generally Claire
Smith, On Baseball, New York Times, September 5, 1994 § 1 at 26; Tom Verducci, In the
Strike Zone, Sports Illustrated, August 1, 1994 at 26.
75. See Mark Maske, National Pastime Faces Lineup of Troubles, Washington Post,
July 11, 1993, at D1.
76. Under the free rider theory, an owner could drastically cut the payroll, contribute
nothing to the value of the league, but earn profits from his or her share of the league-wide
revenue. The problem was introduced above in subsection IV.-A. and is discussed in further
detail below in subsection IV.-F.
77. See generally Miller, supra note 19.
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F. Fiduciary Duties and Free Riders: Enforcement by Own-
ers, Players and Municipalities
As the introduction noted, professional sports franchise own-
ers have entered into complex contractual relationships with their
fellow owners, players, and governmental entities. These arrange-
ments are often difficult to label, but may in fact create fiduciary
duties between the parties. The law surrounding fiduciary obliga-
tions is complex and often ambiguous. As two experts on the sub-
ject noted, "[1]egal theorists and practitioners have failed to define
precisely when a [fiduciary] relationship exists, exactly what con-
stitutes a violation of this relationship, and the legal consequences
generated by such a violation. 7'8 This uncertainty may complicate
the issues of fiduciary liability in the professional sports context,
but it need not undermine the availability of this potential cause
of action.
These experts also note that partnership and joint venture ar-
rangements are among business relationship paradigms which trig-
ger mutual fiduciary obligations.7 Commentators have suggested
that while professional sports leagues do not identically match any
business organizational form, they most closely parallel partner-
ships.80 Courts have generally taken a functional, rather than a for-
malistic, approach in determining if the parties to an agreement
have created a fiduciary relationship:
It is the subject, and not the name of the arrangement between
(the parties) which determines their legal relationship toward
each other, and if, from a consideration of all the facts and cir-
cumstances, it appears that the parties intended, between them-
selves, that there should be a community of interest of both the
property and profits of a common business or venture, the law
treats it as their intention to become partners, in the absence of
other controlling facts. 1
Owners would appear to meet this definition, at least as to most
elements of the venture of putting on professional sports events.
In addition, courts have recognized that because of the inter-
dependence between franchises, individual owners owe each other
fiduciary duties.82 Such liability makes sense in the Padres scena-
78. Robert Cooter and Bradley Friedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1045, 1045-46 (1991).
79. Id. at 1046.
80. See, e.g., Shropshire, supra note 3, at 588.
81. Vohland v. Sweet, 433 N.E. 2d 860, 864 (Ind. App. 1982)(emphasis added).
82. See Professional Hockey Corp. v. World Hockey Ass'n, 143 Cal. App. 3d 410, 415-
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rio. The Werner Group's actions affect road attendance, television
ratings, and sales of merchandise, all of which affect the other
owners' pocketbooks. Further, the Padres' decisions clearly affect
the competitive balance of the league and thus jeopardize the suc-
cess of the entire enterprise.
Establishing a business relationship possessing the fiduciary
duties of loyalty and care between the parties does not end the
investigation. As noted above, the boundaries of these duties are
unclear and difficult issues of proof would remain for an owner
claiming breach (particularly regarding the effect of uncompetitive
teams on overall league revenues). It is clear, however, that pursuit
of individual profit by one partner or joint venturer at the expense
of another will often run afoul of fiduciary principles. In a classic
statement on the subject of fiduciary duties, Judge (later Justice)
Cardozo stated:
Joint venturers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms
of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at
arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A
trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the mar-
ketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.8
Thus, an owner who slashed his or her payroll in the interest of
higher individual profits, but at the expense of lower league-wide
revenues, might well violate his or her duties to the other league
owners. Whether these interests would spark action or cause own-
ers to avoid acting against each other for fear of undermining their
own autonomy is questionable.
Individual owners may also hold fiduciary ties to the league's
players. [I HAVE NOT SEEN THIS ASSERTION ARGUED ANYWHERE ELSE.]
The sharing of revenue between players and owners creates a type
of joint venture arrangement in which players have a direct con-
tractual stake in seeing the league's overall revenues rise. Given
the legal emphasis upon "the community of interests" regarding
profits and property,8 4 and the well-established principle that such
fiduciary business relationships may be formed by parties who sup-
ply skill, labor, and capital,85 the players would have a strong claim
of partner or co-venturer status. Again, such liability makes sense;
16, 191 Cal. Rptr. 773, 776-77 (1983).
83. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 459, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
84. See supra note 81 and related text.
85. See, e.g., Vohland, supra note 81.
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when an individual owner fails to contribute to, or damages, the
value of league by fielding an uncompetitive team, the owner di-
rectly damages the players who receive a set percentage of league-
wide revenues. Players in leagues which are already involved in
player/owner revenue sharing arrangements, perhaps without a
sufficient floor on individual team payrolls, might bring fiduciary
duty suits against owners, such as Werner, who are building low-
budget teams.
Players would face the same difficult issues of proof as owners.
In addition, because the players' union is a party to the collective
bargaining agreement with the owners, the union would likely have
to bring an action to enforce the fiduciary duties. Should the union
be unamenable to the requests of players from under-financed
clubs, these players might lodge duty of fair representation claims
against the union. Given the union's concern for the impact of un-
competitive teams on league-wide salaries,8 such player-union
conflicts seem unlikely.
Governmental bodies might also file fiduciary duty suits
against individual owners who slash payrolls. Municipalities, in
particular, frequently provide substantial subsidies, often in the
form of friendly stadium deals, to professional sports franchises.8 7
Governmental officials might argue that such arrangements create
joint ventures which carry some mutual fiduciary duties. Because
the interdependence and revenue sharing elements of the owner-
owner and owner-player contexts are less apparent in the owner-
government context, courts may be unreceptive to fiduciary suits
brought by governmental bodies.
G. Eminent Domain Actions by Municipalities: From Joint
Ventures to Hostile Takeovers
While governmental entities would likely have a difficult time
winning a fiduciary duty suit against a sports franchise owner, they
may have a much more powerful form of legal recourse, an eminent
domain action.88 If fans, angry over ownership decisions, created
pressure on their representatives, a municipality might opt to seize
86. See supra notes 69-70 and related text.
87. The city of San Diego provided perhaps the most direct subsidy on record in the
late 1970s when its city council advanced the Padres cash to make salary payments to play-
ers. See Lionel Sobel, Professional Sports and the Law (1977) at 531-32.
88. Eminent domain proceedings allow governmental units to take private property
for public use upon the payment of just compensation. See generally Jesse Dukeminier and
James Krier, Property, 3d ed. (1993) at 1142-64.
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the local team. Such action would in effect accomplish the goals of
Harris' public trust theory. 9
Two municipalities, Oakland and Baltimore, have attempted
to utilize eminent domain authority to block relocations of their
local professional football franchises. The California Supreme
Court upheld Oakland's authority to take intangible property such
as a sports franchise under the eminent domain statute,90 but sub-
sequently, a lower court ruled that the taking violated the dormant
commerce clause.91 The court in the Baltimore case did not reach
either of the above issues, but instead rejected the city's claim on
somewhat narrow jurisdictional grounds. 92
While the decision in Raiders II would appear to bar action by
the city of San Diego in this case, other jurisdictions might not
follow the California state court's interpretation of the Commerce
Clause.93 A recent Supreme Court decision, which arguably nar-
rowed the dormant commerce clause, might increase this possibil-
ity.9 4 Regardless of its ultimate success, the mere threat of an emi-
nent domain action may cause an owner to reconsider his or her
tactics.
V. CONCLUSION
A familiar sports cliche states that "the game belongs to the
fans." While this claim may be true on some metaphysical level, it
seldom resolves the specific controversies which arise in the world
of professional sports. Franchise owners' pretensions of absolute
autonomy are equally inapposite. Another somewhat metaphysical
concept, the notion that property should be construed as a bundle
of rights,9 5 provides a more helpful framework for analyzing these
conflicts. The Padres are a complex entity created by the capital of
the Werner Group and the other league owners, the labor of the
league's players, the facilities and services of the city of San Diego,
and the support of fans. Thus, one should not be surprised that all
of the above parties can assert a variety of colorable legal rights
89. See supra notes 56-65 and related text.
90. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal.3d 60, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982) (Raid-
ers I).
91. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 174 Cal. App. 3d 414, 220 Cal. Rptr. 673
(1982) (Raiders II).
92. City Council of Baltimore v. Baltimore Football Club, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278 (D.
Md. 1985).
93. See Raiders II, supra note 91.
94. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
95. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964).
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regarding how the "property" in question should be handled. The
legal system serves the world of sports, not because it will resolve
each of these claims, but rather because it may. The shadow cast
by the law encourages the various constituencies to cooperate with
each other and thereby preserve the enterprise they combined to
create.
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